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The German Campaign in Kurland 1915 
James S. Corum 
Introduction 
The Eastern Front of World War One is one of the great understudied and 
underappreciated chapters of the Great War.  Since the Eastern Front has not been studied 
in depth it also means that some very interesting smaller campaigns have been almost 
completely ignored.  One of the important overlooked campaigns is the German campaign 
in Kurland 1915.  This was one of the Eastern Front’s secondary campaigns and, as such, 
has received little attention. This is unfortunate as smaller campaigns can tell us a great 
deal about the nature of the forces involved and provide important insights into the 
tactical and operational innovations of the war. 
The 1915 campaign in Latvia is interesting for several reasons. It is an early example of 
modern joint operations in which the assault on Libau (Liepaja) consisted of German 
army forces supported by ships of the German Baltic Fleet who also provided air 
reconnaissance support. Most notably, the Eastern Front in 1915, especially the Kurland 
campaign, saw the last the large scale cavalry operations in Europe in World War I. This 
campaign provides a good picture of the German Army in transition and the innovations 
in tactics and organization and doctrine that took place in the early months of the war. 
One of the things that made the German army of World War I so formidable was its 
ability to innovate in organization, weapons and tactics. The campaign in Kurland 
provides a good snapshot of the German army as it developed in the early part of the war.  
Due to Allied bombing of Potsdam in April 1945 with the heavy damage to the German 
military archives located there, many World War I unit records were lost. Detailed daily 
battle coverage for Eastern Front campaigns is often missing.  Luckily the military history 
office of the German Reichsarchiv (Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsanstalt) in the late 
1920s and early 1930s produced a number of highly detailed studies of the 1915 Eastern 
campaigns which used the original unit battle diaries and reports and these documents still 
survive.1 In addition, many German regiments and even divisions and corps, published 
unit histories in the 1920s and these provide extensive details of daily operations. Luckily, 
German cavalry regiments tended to write detailed histories and as the 1915 campaign 
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featured many cavalry units, these are especially useful.2 Finally, several of the major 
figures of the campaign wrote memoirs. Of course, one can rarely get fully accurate 
information from memoirs, but they do tell us much about the views of the senior officers 
involved in planning and leading the campaign.3 
The German Strategic Position in the East 1914-15 
General Erich von Falkenheyn was made chief of staff in the fall of 1914 and he viewed the 
Western Front as the decisive front of the war. Therefore, he was always reluctant to send 
significant German forces to the East. Germany faced the dilemma of a two front war—and in the 
spring of 1915 with the entry of Italy into the war—a three front war.  So the German army in the 
East always fought with limited forces.  The Eastern Front Headquarters, Ober Ost, with von 
Hindenburg commanding with Ludendorff his chief of staff (to 1916 when Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff took over direction of the High Command ( Oberste Heeresleitung- OHL), always 
had to debate with Falkenheyn to justify the deployment of forces to the East forces for major 
operations.4  This meant that OHL might allow the Eastern Front forces for a major operation on 
one part of the front, but any requests for forces beyond this tended to be denied. Thus, the 
operation in Kurland in the spring and summer of 1915 was very much a secondary operation 
was overshadowed by much larger events. But even secondary operations can have major 
strategic consequences. 
In late 1914 and early 1915, as it became obvious that the war would last a long time, the German 
army underwent a massive reorganization process aimed at providing more divisions for the army 
and to improve command and control and add firepower to the divisions. To grow the number of 
divisions the divisions were reduced from four regiments (two brigades) to three regiments (one 
brigade) and the number of divisional artillery batteries were also reduced so as to provide a 
cadre for the new divisions.  
The Situation on the Eastern Front – German Strategy in the East 1915 
Even after the defeat of the most immediate threat to Germany, the destruction of the Russian 
Second Army in August September 1914 at Tannenberg, the vast Russian army in the East was 
still seen as a direct threat to Germany. To defend the German border along Silesia the Ninth 
Army was created and in January 1915 and the 10th Army created in East Prussia. The First Battle 
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of the Masuran Lakes (Sept 1914) was a sharp blow the Russian 1st Army, which was forced to 
retreat and lost 20,000 POWs. The Second Battle of the Masuran Lakes was a huge victory for 
the German 10th Army with the Russian 10th Army crippled– with over 100,000 POWs lost and 
the Russians driven out of East Prussia. By spring 1915 the Russian forces in the north were in 
poor shape and in a process of rebuilding.5  
 But while the Germans had the situation on their borders under control, there were serious 
problems along the front of Germany’s ally Austria.  While facing defeat against the German 8th, 
9th and 10th Armies- the Russians smashed two Austrian armies in Galicia. With hundreds of 
thousands of Austrian casualties (two armies lost) Austria was on the ropes and desperately 
needed German help. Thus, in the spring of 1915 the top priority for the Germany army in the 
East was to help the Austrians. For this purpose, a new army, the 11th, was created with General 
von Mackensen as army commander and with Colonel Hans von Seeckt as his chief of staff. The 
new German 11th Army, with the Austrian 4th Army under its control, planned a huge 
breakthrough battle at Gorlice in Galicia on 2 May to open the Russian line on a broad front and 
force the Russians to retreat from Lemberg and beyond. Several hundred guns were concentrated 
and readied for a surprise offensive. The German High Command ordered that all other 
operations on the Eastern Front would support this one.6  As only a few divisions could be spared 
from the West Front or from the new divisions a being stood up in early 1915, there were few 
troops allocated to other operations in the East. The Northwestern Front sector of the front that 
had produced the great victories by the German 8th and 10th Armies saw divisions removed to 
support the German Ninth Army (before Warsaw) and the 11th Army (Galicia). If the offensive at 
Gorlice worked the Germans hoped for a decisive defeat of Russian armies that would result in 
the capture of Warsaw and all of Poland.  
Why an Offensive in Kurland? 
At the same time that German efforts were to be concentrated on the Galicia offensive Ober Ost 
saw an opportunity for a secondary offensive in Kurland. After the terrific losses at the Second 
Masuran Lakes the surviving divisions of the Russian 10th Army were sent to the rear to be 
rebuilt. With the main Russian effort against the Austrians the Russians were weak on the 
northwest front and Kurland was largely undefended.  The Germans accurately estimated that the 
Russians had only 25,000 troops in the province north of Schaulen (northern Lithuania) in 
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April/May 1915 and these were a collection of poorly equipped reserve units, cavalry units and 
fortress troops.7 The Germans also monitored the situation at Libau and noted that the defenses of 
the most forward Russian coastal fortress were weak and the garrison small. In short, it was a 
good target of opportunity. For the German part, any offensive into Kurland would be highly 
limited by the small forces available to them and the lack of logistics once the Germans crossed 
the Russian frontier.  The main German rail line to the northwestern front ended at Tilsit in East 
Prussia and troops and supplies could also be shipped by sea via Memel. But from those locations 
any advancing German forces would have to operate far from rail lines (the Russians used a 
broader rail gauge and the Germans could not use the Russian railroads until the track was re-laid 
to the European gauge) and over poor roads. Operations would have to be mobile and the lack of 
logistics meant that the Germans could fight no major set-piece battles as the German wagon 
transport system could not supply the large quantities of ammunition needed for major battles. 
The German logistics priority was to the south– to support the 11th Army.  In the Gorlice sector 
the Germans had a much more extensive rail system to work with and the Germans allocated 
their valuable railroad units to the sector to rebuild the Russian lines as they were captured and 
maintain the offensive in that sector. 
Along with the opportunity to advance into a weakly held sector of the front the Germans had 
several other reasons to attack Kurland. First of all was the political reason.  The Germans 
wanted greater security for East Prussia. Parts of East Prussia had suffered greatly under Russian 
occupation from August 1914 to February 1915.8 A brigade sized Russian cavalry raid on Memel 
in March 1915, which held the city for a few days, reinforced the need to secure East Prussia.9 
The German Navy was especially worried about the Russian naval base at Libau (Liepaja) and 
were justly concerned that Libau would be used as an advanced base for Russian and British 
Submarines. This proved to be a very legitimate concern considering the problems the Germans 
faced from British subs in the Baltic in 1916 and 1917. The German Baltic Fleet commander 
Prince Heinrich wanted Libau taken quickly and offered the full support of Baltic Fleet, which 
consisted mainly of cruisers and light vessels.10 Ober Ost also noted that Libau might make a 
useful base for German logistics for future operations. In this the German assessment was again 
correct as Libau had an excellent port and became a major logistics base and after its fall quickly 
became a major logistics base for the German army on the Eastern Front. 
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Finally, there were strategic/operational reasons that favored an offensive in Kurland. OHL 
wanted a diversionary operation to begin on the Kurland front just before the big offensive in 
Galicia on May 2. Such an operation, the High Command reasoned, would divert and withhold 
Russian reinforcements from main battle in Galicia. A successful German advance could threaten 
the key Russian fortress at Kaunas and a cavalry raid against Vilnius could disrupt Russian rail 
traffic.11 
Chief of staff General von Falkenhayn, from the start had been suspicious of allocating forces for 
the Libau operations and argued that Libau attack ought to have a lower priority in the “Big 
Picture”. For their part, Ober Ost argued that Libau was a constant danger to East Prussia, that it 
was a weakly garrisoned place and could be easily taken with weak forces. Ober Ost also argued 
that the German Baltic Fleet wanted this operation against Libau and assured the army of naval 
support. As few forces were engaged von Falkenheyn approved the operation. 
Military Situation.  Cavalry in 1914– A light force 
Cavalry would be a big feature of all the war operations in Kurland in 1915 as there were large 
cavalry forces of corps size arrayed on both sides. In 1914 the mobilized German Army had 11 
cavalry divisions. A division contained six cavalry regiments in 3 brigades. Each regiment had 
approximately 700 soldiers.  Each cavalry division had 12 light guns (3 batteries), 1 machine gun 
company (6 heavy MGs), 1 motor transport company with a total of about 4500 rifles– not much 
more firepower than ONE infantry regiment.  A 1914 infantry division had more than 13,000 
men and 72 artillery pieces. Cavalry divisions could move quickly but had no real staying power-
and were not suitable for major combat operations. The cavalry served primarily as a support arm 
for the infantry.12   Russian cavalry divisions were organized in a similar way to the Germans as 
small mobile units with only a small artillery element.  The main difference was that the Russians 
had many more cavalry divisions than the Germans. 
 
The German cavalry arm saw considerable action in the early days of the war on both the Eastern 
and Western Fronts.  While searching for the enemy the German cavalry was also expected to 
drive away enemy cavalry to prevent them from collecting information on German movements 
and dispositions.13 But after October 1914 there was little need for cavalry on the Western Front 
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which had by then settled down to positional warfare.  In late 1914 some cavalry divisions were 
transformed into infantry divisions and others were sent to the Eastern Front where they would be 
of some use. 
 
Unlike the infantry corps of the German Army, which were very permanent organizations, 
cavalry corps were elastic formations created for specific operations and included a mix of 
cavalry and some attached infantry units and were usually named after the commanding general.  
After each operation, divisions and brigades would normally be detached to other corps and 
armies and, as an operational need arose, news corps were organized for operations.14 
 
There were few major cavalry charges by the German army in World War I. Tactics had changed 
considerably due to the experience of the Boer War and Russo-Japanese War.  Cavalry units 
usually operated in partnership with infantry units and fought as combined arms formations with 
infantry and artillery.  By 1915 the German cavalry commanders knew enough not to make direct 
assaults by mounted troops against prepared enemy positions, but the Russians had yet to learn 
this lesson and continued to use the mounted charge in their tactical repertoire. For example, on 
the afternoon of 10 August, 1915, a Cossack regiment made a mounted charge against the 
German 5th Cavalry Division’s forward outposts.  German machine guns and artillery literally 
massacred the Russian regiment.15      
 
During the German offensive to overrun Latvia and Poland in the fall of 1915, the German 
cavalry had the mission to cover the relatively open flanks of the German infantry corps and to 
seek out and defeat Russian cavalry formations reconnaissance.  For the cavalry it was a war of 
small operations and dismounted engagements rather than large battles.  In the summer of 1915 
German cavalry units often slipped through gaps in the Russian lines to raid rail lines and depots 
behind the front. On several occasions the German cavalry captured Russian supply columns.16  
But by late 1915 the era of major cavalry operations on the Eastern Front was over as that front 
also became characterized by trench warfare. From October 1915 to January 1917 the 5th Cavalry 
Division’s battle summary simply lists “Defensive operations in the Pripet Marshes.”17  
  
Cavalry Reorganized and Evolves 
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Cavalry was not useful in the West so in late 1914 the German High Command reorganized two 
cavalry divisions as infantry divisions and sent other cavalry divisions to the East where the 
lightly manned front gave the cavalry scope to operate. The cavalry units that remained in 1915 
become hybrid divisions. Each cavalry division in the Northwest had one infantry battalion 
(1,000 men) assigned to it and additional machine companies assigned, as well as mortar and 
bicycle companies (The German Army had 80 bicycle companies in 1915).  However, the cavalry 
divisions still lacked artillery. Still, with additional infantry the cavalry became more capable of 
taking and holding ground. As the Russian roads were generally not suitable for bicycles the 
additional infantry attached to the cavalry divisions in the Kurland operation were provided with 
light Russian wagons to move the troops quickly. 
Cavalry Tactics of 1915.   
The cavalry was armed with carbines, sabers and lances and served as a tactical reconnaissance 
force while the operational and strategic reconnaissance missions were taken over by the 
airplane. In prewar maneuvers the cavalry and aircraft had practiced coordinating their efforts 
and the result was that, when the war came, the two reconnaissance arms were highly effective in 
providing accurate information on the location and movements of enemy forces.18  For the 
German cavalry flank protection and support for infantry were vital missions. The cavalry lacked 
the firepower to take on infantry units, so cavalry was used operationally to get around Russian 
defenses and threaten the Russian infantry from the rear. Cavalry also served as a screening force 
to keep Russian cavalry away and as a blocking force to seize or cut key points, but these forces 
had limited power to hold a position unless supported by infantry. Raiding enemy railroad lines 
and disrupting enemy logistics was a major mission of both the German and Russian cavalry and 
the fluid operations in the East offered some considerable opportunities for this. Cavalry was a 
highly mobile force and in the fluid operations of April-May 1915 in Kurland the Germans made 
advances of greater than 50 km per day in the opening days of the campaign.19 
April 1915 Gruppe Lauenstein  Created in E. Prussia 
The German 10th Tenth Army that had routed the Russians in the battle of the Masuran Lakes in 
February was largely stripped of its infantry division strength to support the German/Austrian 
offensive in Galicia.  Thus, any operation in Kurland in the spring and summer of 1915 was to be 
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a true ‘economy of force” operation with German forces in the northernmost sector of the front 
allowed only very limited firepower and logistics support. For the Kurland campaign Gruppe 
Lauenstein, a corps strength force, was created. The Gruppe Lauenstein commanded Cavalry 
Corps I with the 3rd Cavalry Division and the Bavarian Cavalry Division, and the 8th Reserve 
Division. Based at Memel Gruppe Lauenstein had the 6th Cavalry Division and the 6th Reserve 
Division as well as an array of Landsturm units from East. Prussia. The main weight of offensive 
was to be on the southern flank of Kurland to threaten Kaunas. The Chief of Staff von 
Falkenheyn focused the German Eastern efforts on the offensive in Galicia and approved only 
limited efforts on other sectors of the Eastern Front.20  
But Ober Ost had its own agenda and after Tannenberg and the Second Battle of the Masuran 
Lakes certainly had a lot of credibility. Hindenburg and Ludendorff wanted more troops for 
Eastern operations and resented that the 10th Army was stripped of some infantry divisions for the 
Gorlice operation.  For his part, von Falkenheyn approved an advance on Libau only if no real 
Russian resistance was likely.  Luckily, the German intelligence on the Russians was thorough, as 
it had been through the war in the East since Tannenberg. The Germans had two main advantages 
in the field of intelligence beyond having better trained and more capable staff officers: first of 
all, the Germans had an efficient and well-trained air service that throughout the campaign 
provided accurate information on Russian troop movements and activity behind the lines. 
Secondly, the Germans had an efficient signals intelligence service that routinely intercepted the 
Russian Army’s radio messages. The Russian messages must have been sent in the clear or had 
such simple codes that the Germans could easily break the messages and read the Russian 
commander’s mail. The battle reports of the Masuran Lake campaign in early 1915 noted several 
important moments in the campaign in which the Germans learned of the Russian plans by 
signals intercepts.21 From Tannenberg on the German Air Service performed well in the long 
range reconnaissance mission, also noting and following major Russian troop movements well 
behind the front in time for the Germans to react and counter the Russian moves.22  
These advantages of efficient signals intelligence and air reconnaissance were also key to the 
German success in the Kurland campaign. While the Russian Army was often unsure of what the 
Germans were doing (in the opening moves of the campaign the Stavka believed that the advance 
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into Kurland was nothing more than a large raid) the Germans were well informed of major 
Russian deployments and movements.   
Comparing the Two Armies 
The Germans could take considerable operational risks when operating against the more 
numerous Russians because they were sure that—man for man – they were a much better army. 
In this their assessment was quite correct. The Russian Army that went to war in August 1914 
was fairly well equipped, but training and leadership were only adequate.  The German officer 
corps was better trained and educated, the German general staff officers were much better at 
planning and logistics than their Russian counterparts, and the German Army relied on its superb 
corps of professional NCOs to maintain unit combat effectiveness even in the toughest fighting. 
While there were many talented Russian officers, which is proven by the rise of generals like 
Brusilov and Kornilov during the war, the general pool of competent leaders was very thin in 
Russia compared to Germany. Moreover, the heavy losses of troops and especially of 
experienced officers in the early battles of the war, especially at Tannenberg and the Masuran 
Lakes, meant that the new replacement officers and soldiers arrived at the front poorly trained 
and prepared for combat. This was in contrast to the Germans who maintained a very effective 
system of officer and soldier training throughout the entire war.23 Strong and well trained 
leadership also meant that the Germans could adapt more rapidly to new conditions at the front. 
Coupled with the inherent weakness of leadership and soldier training the Russian Army of 1915 
suffered from a severe lack of munitions and equipment. In early 1915 Russian artillery shell and 
munitions production was very low, and even rifles were in short supply. Some of the most basic 
equipment was lacking. For example, Russian artillery brigades had to manage with only one 
telephone for communications. While the Russians managed to increase munitions and 
equipment production in 1916, in 1915 the disparities between German and Russian equipment 
and munitions supply were enormous.24 While the Russians could be tenacious in the defense and 
would carry out some well-handled divisional and brigade attacks in the Kurland campaign, the 
battles of Tannenberg and the Masuran Lakes had taught the German soldier that he could handle 
the Russians even on their home ground. 
Initial Operations in Kurland 
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Gruppe Lauenstein would begin its offensive on 27 April, before the great German offensive in 
Galicia, so to divert the Russian Army’s attention. It was based around a rapid cavalry advance 
and was expected to face little opposition as the Russians held Kurland mainly with cavalry 
forces and some poorly trained and equipped reserve units.  The Ist Cavalry Corps would drive 
on Schaulen and Mitau- both key rail junctions and seize, or at least cut, those lines. The 6th 
Cavalry Division would strike toward Mitau (Lat. Jelgava), mainly as a raid since cavalry 
divisions had little ability to hold ground. With the exception of the force to take Libau moving 
north, most German forces would move due east from East Prussia or southeast so that the vital 
fortress city of Kaunas would be placed under threat.  
For the Libau Operation a special task force was created under Gruppe Lauenstein and placed 
under the command of Colonel Graf von Schulenburg.  Schulenburg’s task force consisted of the 
3rd Cavalry Brigade – two regiments with 1400 men, an Infantry Regiment from 6th Reserve 
Division, two East Prussia Landsturm battalions, one Landsturm cavalry squadron from 
Königsberg, 230 dismounted cavalry soldiers from the 13th Hussars, Reserve Pioneer Battalion 
34, one pioneer company from the 6th Reserve Division, Mortar Detachment 107 (medium 
mortars), a machine gun detachment, a pioneer siege train detachment, eight light artillery 
batteries, three heavy artillery batteries. The grand total of forces was 9 cavalry squadrons, 5 
infantry battalions with 8,000-9,000 men. Their mission was to strike north from Memel and 
capture the Russian fortress port of Libau.25 
The Russians and the Fortress Policy 
In the 1890s Libau was built up as a main forward base for the Russian Baltic Fleet. Libau had 
highly defensible terrain, with swamps and lakes protecting it on the south and eastern sides, the 
sea to the west, and only the northern flank of the city offering an easy approach. The south and 
east of the city offered only limited areas of dry ground for an attacking force. The Russians built 
large fortresses to cover the land approaches and emplaced coastal artillery batteries to protect 
from a sea attack. 
The fortress construction at Libau was part of a grand scheme of the Russian Empire from the 
1890s to World War One to build a series of large fortresses to protect key cities. These fortresses 
were manned with large forces and thousands of heavy artillery pieces and were stocked with 
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munitions and supplies to withstand a long siege. Kaunus and Warsaw were also protected by a 
ring of large fortresses.26 
Unfortunately for the Russians, this vastly expensive program turned into a trap for the Russian 
forces once the war began.  True, they had the potential to delay the Germans and force the 
Germans to undertake a large scale siege, but on the other hand, the Germans could easily bypass 
the fortresses and cut them off. In the end, rather than lose large numbers of fortress troops to a 
German siege, the Russians abandoned these vastly expensive fortifications.  In the case of Libau, 
as with other fortresses, the forts were built mostly with older masonry techniques that would not 
have stood up to German siege guns. In short, the Libau fortresses in particular were obsolete 
even before they were built. 
Advance on Libau 
The German intent was to take Libau quickly and by surprise. The great German advantage here, 
and in all phases of the campaign into Kurland, was excellent intelligence on the Russian forces 
and movements.  The German aerial reconnaissance squadrons at the front were highly efficient 
and were able to monitor the state of the Russian forces in the Libau area, and also spot any 
Russian movement to and from the city. In addition, because the Germans army air units were 
mostly concentrated to support the 11th Army offensive in Galicia, the German Navy provided its 
reconnaissance seaplanes to support the army throughout the operations in April to June in 
Kurland. It was the naval aircraft that accurately reported relatively few Russian troops in the 
fortress and evidence that the Russians were evacuating the city rather than making a fight.  The 
German Baltic Fleet also provided a light cruiser squadron to support the attack on the city (2nd 
class light cruisers with 105mm guns) and also torpedo boats.27  
When the German advance began on 27 April the first two prongs of the advance were to be 
Gruppe Schulenberg, which advanced on Libau from Memel, and the main force of Gruppe 
Lauenstein, which struck out from Tilsit (East Prussia at and the end of the German rail line) due 
west to Schaulen to seize the key rail junction.  Taking Schaulen would restrict any movement of 
Russian reinforcements in the northwestern front and would make it impossible for the Russians 
to quickly move troops to Libau by rail. The major forces struck west on 27 April meeting no 
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Russians on the first day and advancing more than 70 kilometers in the first two days. The force 
to attack Libau moved north from Memel on 2 May.28 
Gruppe Schulenburg advanced on two roads north to Libau. The southern road along the coast 
(still extant today) included the Landsturm battalions and a machine gun detachment and a few 
light artillery pieces.  The main force of the Gruppe Schaulenberg would advance to the northeast 
and approach the city from the east. Between 2 and 4 May the advancing Germans saw a few 
Russian cavalry patrols but there was no combat. On 4 May the Germans took the village of 
Grobina, which controlled the eastern approach to the city. 
As the Germans approached from the south a Navy torpedo boat landed a liaison officer to work 
with the Landsturm force and via light signals to the cruisers just offshore. The warships would 
provide fire support for the attack on Libau’s fortifications. Meanwhile, navy aircraft maintained 
constant surveillance of the situation. On 5 May Libau was fully cut off and on 6 May the 
Germans brought their heavy guns up to Grobina to bombard Libau. On 7 May the German army 
began shelling the city and its forts with support from by the Baltic Fleet’s light cruisers.  
The Battle for Libau 
The German cavalry units deployed north of the city to cut off any Russian retreat. On 6 May the 
Germans fought one skirmish with 40-50 Russian cavalrymen, but there were no signs the 
Russians were either evacuating or reinforcing.  The Russian coastal defenses fired at German air 
reconnaissance as the German Baltic Fleet deployed near the city and minesweepers were fired 
on by a coastal battery. On the 6th the German air reconnaissance reported that the Russians were 
leaving their fortifications and were demolishing fortifications on the eastern side of the city. The 
German commander deployed the 9th Uhlan Regiment to block any Russian evacuation by the 
northern road, the last possible Russian escape route from the city. 
On May 7 the main attack on Libau began with naval gunfire support as well as the army artillery 
pounding the Russian forts.  The German Navy sent cruisers in close to shore to bombard the 
Russian forts guarding the southern approach to the city.  On 7 May the Landsturm units stormed 
one Russian fort on the southern edge of the city with little loss.  North of Libau the 9th Hussars 
noted little activity—some trenches were dug on Northwest of the city but were weakly defended.  
On 7 May Colonel Schulenburg ordered navy and army artillery fire to begin at 1600 with a 
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heavy barrage for 15 minutes on the eastern forts—then he allowed a pause to ask for the Russian 
surrender.  The barrage began and there was no surrender, so the Navy and Army fired on the 
coastal defenses and the main forts to prepare for a major assault the next day. By 1800 fires were 
reported in several places in the city. The Germans broke off their fire in the evening of 7 May 
and prepared to resume the ground attack the next day. To the north the 9th Hussars patrolled the 
northern side of the Libau defenses and saw only woods and swamps and a few small Russian 
cavalry detachments that were not inclined to fight. 
On the morning of 8 May, with the German Landsturm successfully advancing into the city after 
taking the southern fortress, the Russians surrendered the city before the German main force 
could mount its assault.  The small force of naval personnel and reservists manning the forts and 
garrison had never intended to seriously fight for the city and the Germans captured 1600 POWs 
with 12 artillery pieces and 4 machine guns.  Along with the excellent naval port, the Germans 
captured vital raw materials including a large stockpile of zinc. One of Russia’s largest barbed 
wire factories also fell into German hands.  The total German loss in the operation to take Libau 
was 23 men. In short, this was a highly successful operation and more impressive when one 
considers that a large part of the German force were second and even third line reserve forces –
namely the East Prussia Landsturm.29  
Strategic View 
The Russian army was taken completely by surprise by Germany’s offensive in the north and the 
attack was initially dismissed by the Stavka as just a large raid. But as Libau fell and Germans 
seized the rail junction at Schaulen the Russians took the German offensive very seriously indeed 
and rushed reinforcements to the sector.  The first units the Russians had available were second 
line reserves and fortress troops from the interior of Russia, but soon an army corps was sent to 
Riga and additional cavalry units sent to the Kurland front. Soldiers from the Russian 10th, 12th 
and 1st Armies were all detached and rushed to the Kurland front. By the latter part of May the 
Russian forces amounted to 5 infantry divisions and 7 and a half cavalry divisions.30  In early 
June the Russians feared for the loss of Riga and transferred the 12th and 13 Siberian Divisions 
from the battleground in Galicia to the north to stem the German threat. General Plehve took 
command of the newly created 5th Army (with four corps and six cavalry divisions) 
headquartered in Mitau (Jelgava) which controlled all the Russian forces from the Baltic Sea to 
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the junction of the Dubissa and Nieman Rivers.31   Thus, the German High Command’s goal to 
divert Russian forces away from the German 11th Army’s front succeeded brilliantly. In late May 
and early June the Russians outnumbered the Germans on the northern sector of the front.32 
After Libau Fell the Germans held a thin line western Kurland from north of Libau to Mitau 
(Jelgava) and Schaulen to the Niemen River north of Kaunus. The Russians reinforcements 
retook Schaulen, which would see heavy fighting for several weeks. Because the Germans 
intended to threaten Kaunus the main weight of the German forces was in the south, where the 
Russians rushed most of their reinforcements. To the north of Schaulen the front was only thinly 
manned and covered by cavalry patrols.  The lightly manned front allowed the Russian cavalry to 
raid into the rear of the German lines to attack German logistics. On 18-19 June a Russian 
cavalry force was able to slip through the German lines and attack a transport column at Slady.33 
The Russians used their cavalry aggressively to probe and penetrate the Germans lines and 
caused the Germans considerable trouble.34 The Germans also used their cavalry for raids.35 At 
Mitau (Jelgava) the German cavalry force sent to raid the important rail junction failed to take the 
town as a hastily organized battalion of Latvian fortress troops from Riga mounted an effective 
defense. The successful defense of Mitau by the Latvian soldiers gave an impetus for the 
Russians to organize the Latvian Rifles. 
The Russians and Germans around Schaulen and along the Dubissa River to the south settled 
down into a relatively static war with the Germans on the defensive. The main mission of the 
German cavalry in these fluid operations was to support the infantry by working around the 
flanks of Russian defenses and threating the Russian rear, thus forcing the Russians to retreat. 
From mid-May to mid-June the thin German forces in Kurland conducted a holding operation.    
After taking Libau the OHL became nervous and questioned whether the Kurland campaign was 
simply a drain on resources and doubted that Libau and the territory won in the first days of the 
advance could be defended if the Russians made a strong counter offensive once they had a 
significant numerical superiority of forces in the sector. The German focus remained on making 
sure the operation in Galicia had enough troops, so the OHL proposed stripping more troops from 
the northern sectors of the front.36 However, Ober Ost countered with its own plan to advance on 
Kaunas, to threaten Warsaw, and then advance toward Riga. 
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The period from mid-May to mid-June saw constant skirmishing and small battles between 
German and Russian cavalry units.  At this point neither side had enough infantry forces or 
firepower to initiate a major attack. In mid-May Ober Ost noted that the Russians were 
apparently evacuating the northern part of Kurland, a sensible move as the Russians were now 
being hard pressed in the southern part of the front. Still, the German High Command was 
concerned about Gruppe Lauenstein’s forces. As they were spread so thin that they were highly 
vulnerable to a serious Russian attack.  In late May the High Command considered abandoning 
Libau and falling back to Memel.37 This led to a debate between the High Command and Ober 
Ost with Ober Ost convincing von Falkenheyn to release additional forces to the 
Kurland/Lithuania front to reinforce success, and to threaten the Russian forces fighting a 
desperate battle in Poland.  In mid-June German reinforcements were approved to go to the 
Kurland front to support an offensive to begin mid-July. Gruppe Lauenstein was to be renamed 
the Niemen Army.38  The new Niemen Army would consist of the original Gruppe Lauenstein 
(36th Reserve division, 78th Reserve Division, Troop Command Tilsit and assorted cavalry units) 
and Ist Cavalry Corps (3rd Cavalry Division, Bavarian Cavalry Division and 18th Cavalry 
Brigade). Gruppe Morgen (1st Reserve Division, 2nd and 6th Cavalry Divisions, 3rd Cavalry 
Brigade and assorted Landsturm and reserve units being formed into larger forces.39 The Nieman 
Army would be approximately five infantry divisions and five cavalry divisions. The additional 
divisions were given the mission to clear the whole of Kurland.  On 17 July the Germans began a 
major offensive and the northern and eastern half of Kurland fell within five days to the Germans 
with only nominal resistance. The next step was to attack Kaunus, which fell on 8 August. The 
Germans continued to press to the gates of Riga, taking Mitau and Schaulen and key rail 
junctions along the way. In September the front line stabilized from Riga to the south, with all 
Poland in German hands. The 1915 campaign had been a disaster for Russia with two million 
casualties, including 800,000 POWs, lost from May to September.40 
Comments on the Campaign 
The Germans won the initiative in the Northwest with the Battle of the Masuran Lakes in 
February 1915 and kept the initiative through all of 1915 although they were outnumbered by the 
Russians.  The Germans had the advantage in each phase of the 1915 operations because they 
were able to gain operational surprise at every step—at Gorlice, the Masuran Lakes, and in 
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Kurland.  In each case the Germans were able to move rapidly and decisively while the Russians 
simply reacted to each German move without any overall concept of operations. The Russians 
had the advantage in manpower and also in rail transport, but failed to use these advantages. The 
Stavkas’s response was to rush reinforcements a division at a time to the front and never took the 
opportunity to amass a significant force to strike a strong blow against the Germans. 
The war on the Eastern Front was dominated by the need to control the key rail centers.  In 
contrast to the West, there were few railroads to cover the vast distances of the region, which 
made control of rail lines the operational and strategic objective for both sides.  Neither army 
could sustain itself far from the rail lines and it is a wonder that the Germans, who had to supply 
forces as much as 100 KM from the railhead at Tilsit or the ports of Memel and Libau over bad 
roads, managed to keep their forces in the field supplied.    
The campaign in Kurland illustrates the inherent weakness of the Russian Army of 1915 when 
facing the Germans.  The Germans were better equipped, better trained, and the Germans staffs 
showed a tremendous talent for effective planning. The Russian Army had the numbers 
advantage, but that was all. Due to problems in the Russian war industry the Russians suffered 
from a severe shortage of rifles and artillery and ammunition in 1915.  The new Russians 
divisions thrown into the fight were poorly trained and well-trained leaders were in short supply. 
The Stavka’s performance was mediocre at best.  Although the Germans were highly vulnerable 
the Russians never massed forces for an effective counterstrike and fed its reinforcements and 
new divisions into the battle in a piecemeal fashion.  
At the tactical level the Russians could fight well and the German regimental histories of the 
campaign record many sharp fights that pushed the Germans back and which were supported by 
accurate artillery fire. However, the Germans still held a strong advantage at the tactical level as 
well. The most interesting feature of the campaign are the large cavalry forces involved. The 
large distances involved in the East made the 1915 a highly fluid and mobile campaign. The 
cavalry battles along the Kurland front were constant from May to July 1915 and the German 
cavalry clearly proved more capable than their Russian counterparts as they fought both mounted 
battles and dismounted as infantry.  The cavalry operations of 1915 certainly deserve their own 
book.41 
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But perhaps the greatest operational advantage of the Germans was their excellent intelligence. 
Through the whole campaign the German signals intelligence and aerial reconnaissance units of 
the Air Service and German Navy air detachments performed admirably. All the large scale 
Russian movements were spotted well before they reached the front, which allowed the Germans 
to deploy forces to counter the Russians. The Russian Air Service does not seem to have 
performed efficiently in monitoring German movements.  
The operation to take Libau was a well-coordinated naval and ground operation that shows that 
even in the early stages of the war the navy and army could plan and work together. The naval 
and ground cooperation culminated in the highly successful offensive to take the Estonian Islands 
in October 1917.  The payoff of the operation was increased security for the German navy, the 
acquisition of an excellent advanced base, and the development of Libau into a major German 
logistics center for the Eastern Front. 
The offensive into Kurland in the spring of 1915 was envisioned as a limned operation with very 
limited goals. But campaigns take on a life of their own and this limited diversionary operation 
turned into a major campaign that conquered a large part of the Russian territory and set the stage 
for later operations in this key theater. 
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